|  My first reaction to the question "is there more than a semantic 
        difference between concertación and negotiation?" was: "They 
        are different concepts, different modalities of interaction bewteen nations".  As I organizaed my ideas for this presentation, I found more aspects 
        that led me to an act of rebellion -that is to leave aside the original 
        objective of my presentation that was to analyze the cases of Mercosur 
        and FTAA-. The reason is simple: the FTAA has such uncertain future that 
        it does not deserve to be the object of a comparative analysis with something 
        that it´s a reality beyond its limitations and defects.   So, I decided to make the comparison of Mercosur with the European Union 
        - actually with the old European Community -. This should allow us to 
        compare the founding moments of both processes. In my opinion it's in 
        the foundational moments where we can better try to understand the origins 
        of the working methods that are employed in any concrete economic integration 
        process.   The central idea I want to develop is that, in the perspective of building 
        a consensual integration space between sovereign and contiguous nations 
        - as it's the case of both the European Union and Mercosur -, the concepts 
        of concertación and negotiation are complementary. The eventual 
        success or failure of a concrete process greatly depends on the ability 
        of building institutions that could reflect this natural complementation 
        between the concertación and the negotiation dimensions of the 
        working together idea - in a systematic and permanent way - among two 
        or more sovereign nations.   The processes of the European Union and Mercosur are very exotic from 
        a historical point of view. They are recent. We know that what has been 
        historically normal among neighbor countries or neighbors autonomous units 
        of power is the predominance of the logic of conflict and, eventually, 
        war. It has been said that the history of wars have been mainly that of 
        civil wars - wars between neighbors -.   In the cases of the European Union and of Mercosur, the main elements 
        that distinguish both integration processes, were the consensual character 
        of the association, where nobody forces anybody to enter, as well as the 
        vocation of permanence in the associative pact among sovereign nations 
        that are not willing to stop being sovereign.   This is a central issue. In both cases, nations work together because 
        they have reached the conclusion that it is in their benefit and they 
        want to achieve mutual gains.   The sustentation of the original social pact - the foundational pact 
        - is the reciprocity of national interests. From the point of view of 
        each member country, rules are complied because it is in their national 
        interest. Perhaps it could not be convenient for a country to comply with 
        the rules in a particular case. However most probably it is convenient 
        for that country to preserve the system because for instance it has firms 
        with trade, fixed actives and investments all over the region. And so 
        it will comply with the rules even in cases in which it could no be convenient 
        to do so.   Integration processes such as EU and Mercosur, are different from more 
        simple free trade agreements, for example, those between Chile and the 
        United States, or Australia and the United States. In those cases - as 
        it is the case of NAFTA - the rules of the game are set in the founding 
        treaty. It's a kind of one shot agreement. There is nothing substantive 
        to negotiate afterwards. Instead in the cases of the EU and of Mercosur, 
        the original pact is a framework for further development of deep integration 
        through highly complicated negotiations. That's the reason why they need 
        to build institutions that allow them to put together their national interests 
        in a dynamic way - within the framework of a common vision - during the 
        period of development of the integration process. And in both cases it 
        is a period without a precise end.  Let's look to the initial process of the European integration, especially 
        to the formation of the European Community of Coal and Steel (ECCS), which 
        was born from the Schumann Plan in 1950. It created a snow ball effect 
        that derived latter on today European Union. There is where we found the 
        word "concertación" applied to this kind of phenomenon. 
        The word "concertación" derives from the French Plan 
        experience. Jean Monnet was who developed this methodology of "pooling" 
        of interests within a common vision. It is worthy to read his Memories. 
        A fascinating man, son of a producer of Cognac, he has not studied in 
        the university. Since he was young he started to practice his ideas through 
        the organization of provision pools from the United States to Europe during 
        the First and then the Second World War.   The methodology and spirit of the First French Plan is well told by 
        Pierre Massé, also a former Commissaire du Plan, in his book "Le 
        plan ou l´ anti-hasard". Massé says that the spirit 
        of the Plan was the concertación of the economic and social forces 
        of the nation within the framework of common goals and visions. It was 
        mainly about associating workers and businessmen in an economic pact that 
        concerned them and to develop the feeling of participation founded in 
        concrete facts.   This experience served as a precedent for the creation of the High Authority, 
        which was a central organ of the European Community of Coal and Steal. 
        The idea of concertación was in the center of the Monnet-Schumann 
        1950 Plan that originated the European integration process. The main idea 
        of this Plan was to overcome the trend toward conflict and war among European 
        nations. It was a political idea with an economic dimension. Perhaps that 
        explains its strength.   The main original idea has been a real success. Most of it is explained 
        through institutions that allowed member countries - even with an important 
        degree of asymmetries in their relative power - to work together achieving 
        a reasonable degree of equilibrium among their sometimes strongly different 
        national interests. Within the framework of those institutions each country 
        defended their national interests through hard negotiations. But at the 
        same time they were able to put those interests within the framework of 
        common goals and visions. They achieved a highly efficient pattern of 
        concertación of those national interests.  I review these antecedents to focus on the Real Academia Dictionary's 
        definition of the word "concertar" and the word "negotiate", 
        and to analyze their eventual differences. One of the definitions of negotiate 
        is to try through the diplomatic way, from state to state, an issue like 
        a trade alliance treaty and so on. Another definition says to deal with 
        public or private issues aiming to its best achievement. That is nearer 
        the definitions of concertar: to make a pact, to compromise, to deal, 
        to agree on a business. Very close to negotiate. But then there is another 
        meaning of concertar: to bring into line different goals or objectives 
        or intentions. It's interesting that "concertar" has not English 
        translation. In some way, the concept is near to "harmonize".  In my opinion the European experience demonstrate us that there is a 
        strong link between these two concepts when sovereign nations are trying 
        to develop an economic integration process among them. What experience 
        shows - and in the case of Mercosur was my own experience as Argentinean 
        negotiator in the founding moment - is that in this kind of processes 
        the key of success depends greatly in the capacity of its institutions 
        to develop at the same time, negotiations among governments and concertación 
        of their national interests.   Common institutions allow member countries to develop a common vision 
        based in their concrete national interests. That implies to recognize 
        a natural dialectic tension between both the national and regional dimension. 
        In the case of the ECSC, this tension was not denied but on the contrary 
        it was institutionalized through the decision making process and the prevalence 
        of common rules. The common vision was assured by the High Authority. 
        And the prevalence of the rule of law was the main task of the Luxemburg 
        Court of Justice.   In the idea of "harmony" of the English translation of "concertación" 
        we found the equivalent to an orchestra. The "concertador" would 
        be the orchestra conductor. They all have a common script with fixed notes, 
        mainly the agreed rules of the founding pact. That ´s how during 
        sixty years the European nations were able to overcome their antagonisms 
        and instead, they developed a relative efficient and dynamic pattern of 
        working together. They transformed a disruptive dialectic of national 
        interest in a creative process of cooperation and integration. They did 
        so through a strong political vision and will, but mainly trough an institutional 
        framework allowing them to succeed, at least till now.   In the case of Mercosur we have also an integration process among sovereign 
        nations. All of them want to preserve their sovereignty. As in the case 
        of Europe the idea of a regional dimension is based in their capacity 
        of achieving their national interests. This regional dimension is not 
        the result of any kind of hypothetic supranational rationality. It is 
        an integration process that is a result of a permanent pact, with common 
        long term goals, immediate compromises and an embryonic institutional 
        framework.   But the main problem with Mercosur is that as time passed by, what prevailed 
        has been the idea of negotiation against the idea of "concertación". 
        There has not been till now a clear idea of how to institutionalize the 
        function of "concertar". In Europe, "concertación" 
        would not have been possible without a "concertador". The "concertador" 
        is not some body that imposes obligations. On the contrary, is some body 
        that orchestrates, that helps to unveil the common interest. It is a go 
        between mechanism.  How can we explain that this could not be achieved? I would say that 
        there is a kind of open resistance from Brazil and Argentina to accept 
        the idea of a "go between" among them. They have not accepted 
        the idea of having a common organ - a "concertador" - that could 
        develop the function of "concertación". In the case of 
        Brazil that could be explained by its size. But that has been also the 
        case of Argentina, even if in the recent years it has lost its relative 
        economic importance.   History shows that bigger countries in this kind of processes try to 
        keep their national interest and their freedom of action, leading to a 
        precarious institutionalization and legality.   The concrete fact is that there has been a deaf resistance to the idea 
        of any kind of institutionalization of Mercosur that may lead to a common 
        vision within the region. That explains perhaps the strong resentment 
        from Uruguay and Paraguay to the economic integration idea prevalent both 
        in Argentina and Brazil.   In my opinion the main challenge for Mercosur is to develop institutions 
        that allow member countries to defend their national interests through 
        negotiations, but at the same time to put them together within common 
        goals and a common vision. That is to obtain a relative capacity of concertación. 
        I conclude by saying that I visualize in this kind of consensual economic 
        integration processes both functions - negotiation and concertación 
        - as complementary. This implies to have institutions that assure a relative 
        equilibrium between each function. Not understanding these would signify 
        to give away the political advantages of this kind of process. This lesson 
        from the European experience has not been yet fully understood in the 
        Mercosur case. 
 
 
 REFERENCES
 
 MASSÉ, Pierre (1965), "Le Plan ou l´Anti-Hasard", 
        Gallimard, Paris
 MONNET, Jean (1976), "Mémoires", LibrairieFayard, Paris. |