|  It is noteworthy how two processes of regional integration, the European 
        Union and Mercosur, which have some common elements but also notable differences, 
        are going through times of crisis. Some observers even believe that they 
        show the characteristics of a terminal crisis. Others, us included, more 
        cautiously regard these characteristics as a display of methodological 
        problems -how the partner nations can work together-, than of existential 
        ones -why keep working together. The fact is that the Brexit and post-Brexit crises in the EU show the 
        significant differences between member countries on how to build integration 
        in the European regional geographical space.
 For various reasons, these differences are also evident in the Mercosur. 
        The recent questioning of the fact that Venezuela could assume the pro 
        tempore presidency, which would formally correspond in the second half 
        of this year, is clear evidence that something has deteriorated among 
        the partners. We can add to this the recurring questions on the instrument 
        of the common external tariff, explicitly provided for by the Treaty of 
        Asuncion and which, together with its Article 2 (reciprocity of rights 
        and obligations), constitute the guarantee that the founding members gave 
        to each other that the tariff preferences granted reciprocally would not 
        be liquefy.  Three reflections can contribute to place both crises in a wider perspective. The first relates to the fact that both cases are processes of integration 
        between sovereign nations that have voluntarily decided to participate 
        in them, accepting the common rules that were agreed. Some nations did 
        so from the founding moment. Others adhered later of their own will, such 
        the cases of the UK in the EU and Venezuela in Mercosur, among others. 
        Moreover, the British experience suggests that the other member countries 
        were not necessarily bound to accept the new additions (for example, in 
        a first attempt, in 1963, the United Kingdom could not be incorporated 
        to the EU because of the veto of the French government).  Just as no one can force a sovereign nation to form part of an integration 
        process institutionalized in a founding treaty, no one can prevent a member 
        country from withdrawing when the rules provide for this. By its sovereign 
        will, Chile withdrew from the Andean Group and, years later, Venezuela 
        withdrew from the Andean Community of Nations (CAN). The founding agreements 
        provide for this right to withdrawal and the procedures for achieving 
        them. Such is the case today of Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon, which 
        is to regulate the post-Brexit stage of the yet uncertain process of the 
        withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU. The voluntary nature of the participation of a nation in a process of 
        integration and its subsequent agreement to comply with common rules is 
        not a minor detail at the moment of assessing the scope of decisions such 
        as the one taken by the citizens of the United Kingdom in the Brexit referendum.
 The voluntary withdrawal from an integration process is an option that 
        would also be available to a member country of Mercosur that does not 
        agree, for example, with the restrictions involving the instrument of 
        the common external tariff. Of course, in relation to this issue, another 
        option would be to obtain the necessary consensus to amend the Treaty 
        of Asuncion. Even if Decision 32/00 CM were repealed, as in some cases 
        has been suggested, a situation that arises from the provisions of its 
        own founding treaty would not be fully resolved.  The second consideration refers to the fact that, once the political 
        decision to undertake a process of regional integration has been made, 
        the participating nations have the right to exercise the principle of 
        freedom of organization, that is, to choose the most appropriate methodologies 
        to achieve the common objectives (see Angelo Piero Seregni, "Le Organizzazioni 
        Internazionali" Dott.A.Giuffré Editore, Milan 1959). There 
        is no single model on how to build a process of integration between sovereign 
        nations which is voluntary and subject to common rules. Incidentally, 
        the methodologies used have to be related with the density of the commitments 
        that the participating countries are willing to make, especially in the 
        economic sphere and with the deadlines set to achieve the desired objectives. 
       But they should also take into account the legal commitments made by 
        the participating countries with other nations, especially at the multilateral 
        global level. In this regard, the main commitments are those arising from 
        Article XXIV of the GATT. In relation to the trade of goods, paragraph 
        8 of this article -which is now part of the legal framework of the WTO- 
        has definitions of the two main instruments, the free trade zone and the 
        customs union, that allow to arrange trade preferences not extended to 
        other countries of the multilateral global system due to the effects of 
        the most-favored-nation clause (Article I, which is a cornerstone of the 
        GATT legal system).  As we have stated on other occasions, these are definitions that lend 
        themselves to relatively flexible interpretations and not necessarily 
        conform to the more theoretical and dogmatic views of what a free trade 
        area or customs union should be. These are examples of the "constructive 
        ambiguities" that characterize the GATT, of a marked Anglo-Saxon 
        legal nature. Moreover, for developing countries -such the case of Mercosur 
        members- the enabling clause provides an even more flexible framework 
        for the design of a regional integration agreement that includes tariff 
        preferences.  And the third consideration relates to what John Carlin characterized 
        as the "human factor" in international relations (see John Carlin, 
        "Invictus: Nelson Mandela and the Game That Made a Nation", 
        Penguin Books, London 2008, and his weekly column under the same name 
        in the newspaper "El País" of Madrid, on http://elpais.com/autor/john_carlin/a). 
        This involves the vision and leadership provided by those people who inspire 
        or propel significant events in political life. In this case, in the negotiations 
        leading to the founding pact of an integration process and, later on, 
        in the different moments of its development, which often involve overcoming 
        critical situations. The voluntary nature of the regional integration between sovereign nations, 
        based on the respect for common rules; the absence of a single model on 
        how to carry out a voluntary integration process, but existence of multilateral 
        legal commitments that may affect the methodology used for granting trade 
        preferences, and the importance of the vision and political leadership, 
        both at the founding moment and later on, to address critical situations, 
        are then the three factors that can affect the ability of countries trying 
        to undertake a process of regional integration and sustain it over time. Of these factors, the third is perhaps the most relevant. Vision and 
        political leadership are qualities that were present in the various founding 
        moments of European integration. I also believe they were present thirty 
        years ago, at the time of the initial integration agreements between Argentina 
        and Brazil and then during the founding moments of Mercosur.  Vision and political leadership imply the ability of those involved, 
        from their different perspectives, to design agreements and rules that 
        are perceived as potential generators of mutual gains for the participating 
        countries and that can produce a reconciliation of interests and wills 
        to achieve approval and have a significant potential to be effective and 
        penetrate reality. Moreover, vision and political leadership are also 
        required for the task of adapting an integration project and its rules 
        to the continuous changes in the realities.  In the founding moment of European integration, Jean Monnet brought this 
        kind vision and leadership. He was not the only one, but he played a key 
        role in the reconciliation of wills that led to the Treaty of Paris, after 
        the Schumann Declaration of May 9th, 1950. Reviewing his memoirs today 
        is highly recommended for those who are wondering how to continue building 
        a space of European integration (Jean Monnet, "Memoires," Fayard, 
        Paris 1976; in English, "Memoirs", Collins, London 1978, and, 
        in Spanish, "Memorias", Encuentro - CEU, Madrid 2010). Regional integration is a process that is built day by day. Roadmaps 
        require constant adaptation. This involves a dynamic balance between flexibility 
        and predictability resulting from its institutions and rules. Monnet says, 
        in concluding his Memoirs and almost at the end of his long life (he died 
        at 92): "We must make our way day after day; the essential is to 
        have an objective that is clear enough so as not to lose sight of it "(in 
        page 591 of the Spanish version).  A picture of the Kon-Tiki, the raft that in 1947 with a crew of five 
        young men led by the Norwegian Thor Heyerdahl sailed for over one hundred 
        days from Callao in Peru to Polynesia, occupied a prominent place in Jean 
        Monnet's desk in Luxembourg, when he chaired the High Authority of the 
        Coal and Steel European Community. "These young people" -told 
        Monnet to his visitors, as he remembers on the last pages of his memoirs- 
        "chose their course and set sail knowing that they could not turn 
        around. However great their difficulties, they only had one recourse: 
        to move forward". They were driven by a vision that was actually 
        an obsession: to demonstrate that it was possible to sail on raft from 
        South America to Polynesia. They were tenacious and succeeded (see the 
        book on the Kon-Tiki by Thor Heyerdahl "Expedition Kon-Tiki". 
        Simon and Schuster, New York - London, 1984, and also the film "Kon 
        Tiki" (2012), on https://gloria.tv/). 
       In view of the difficulties that the processes of regional integration 
        of the EU and Mercosur are undergoing today, the implicit advice to be 
        drawn from Jean Monnet and the experience of Kon-Tiki is along this lines: 
        be tenacious, go ahead, but adapt navigation courses to the changes in 
        currents, winds and tides.  Backtracking could be the result of not remembering the vision that prompted 
        us to set sail; this is, to begin the construction of a space of regional 
        integration.  It may also involve going back to the scenarios of confrontation and 
        fragmentation that both regions have experienced in the past. Indeed, 
        these were more intense and dramatic in the European case, as illustrated 
        in the book by Hans Magnus Enzensberger, "Europa en ruinas. Relatos 
        de testigos oculares de los años 1944 a 1948", Captain Swing, 
        2013. But in the case of Mercosur, it could mean going back to scenarios 
        such as those that were reversed by the agreements conceived by Raul Alfonsin 
        together, first, with Tancredo Neves and, later, with Jose Sarney. |