| The trend towards a world of large interconnected economic spaces is 
        being accentuated by the transformations that have taken place in the 
        international scenario over the last years. This is introducing gradual 
        but significant changes in the map of world economic competition. It will 
        probably do likewise in the institutional architecture of the global economic 
        order of the future.  Due to its relative economic dimension, such spaces could set into motion 
        a sufficient critical mass of power so as to have a greater incidence 
        in the definition of the ground rules of international economic relations 
        and in the mechanisms of the main global multilateral institutions. In 
        such case, they could act as "rule makers" in the system of 
        world trade, considered in its broader sense as the result of the transnational 
        flow of goods, services, technologies and investments.  Several of these economic spaces are currently represented by individual 
        countries of continental dimensions and everything indicates that they 
        will continue to do so. In fact, towards the year 2050 three major economic 
        spaces could add up to approximately 66% of the world's gross product 
        (at PPP). These countries are China, the US and India (in that order and 
        with a marked distance between China and the other two). They represented 
        51.8% of the world's GDP in 2010. The following four countries (Brazil, 
        Mexico, Russia and Indonesia) would add up only to 13.7% of the total, 
        whereas Germany and the UK would each represent 2.1%. (These figures are 
        based on data from the IMF with projections by the authors and presented 
        by Uri Dadush and William Shaw on page 3 of a recently published book 
        allusively entitled "Juggernaut"; see the reference under Recommended 
        Readings).  In turn, other major economic spaces could be the result of geographic 
        regions organized in groups of countries. In such case, institutionalization 
        could enable them to express themselves under one voice, particularly 
        in many relevant issues pertaining to world economic competition. Possibly, 
        this would be the uttermost manifestation of the political and economic 
        event involving a group of sovereign nations that belong to a given geographical 
        space and that freely decide to build throughout time -and with modalities 
        and methodologies that can differ greatly in each case- an institutionalized 
        region in which they share markets, resources and strategies. This would 
        express itself in a construct with which citizens could identify themselves, 
        giving birth to the idea of "us" and "them" that is 
        a key element for social validation and for the sustainability of this 
        kind of joint regional undertaking.  This is the case of the European Union -at least until today-. In fact 
        this is, for the moment being, the only organized geographic region that 
        has a relevant economic dimension. As long as it can continue to express 
        itself as a merger of countries that preserve their respective sovereignties 
        while working in association, it will be possible to foresee that the 
        European regional space will continue to be a relevant actor in the world 
        economic scenario of the next decades. However, the current crisis of 
        its integration process - is it just a crisis of the Euro? Is it a governance 
        crisis as well? Or worse yet, is it an identity and social legitimacy 
        crisis of the very idea of an institutionalized region? - poses some serious 
        doubts on its future role as a large organized economic space, at least 
        equivalent in magnitude and relevance to each one of the three countries 
        mentioned above. The fact that not all the citizens of the EU member countries 
        consider that Greece's troubles (or, for that matter, the troubles of 
        any other member country with strong financial difficulties) are "their 
        problem" may be revealing an existential crisis of deeper consequences. 
       Yet, in the future, this could be the case of other geographical regions 
        of great dimensions such as, for example, Southeast Asia, Northern and 
        Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East. Indeed, it could become the case 
        of South America as well. At present, however, it could be difficult to foresee when it will be 
        possible for these other geographical spaces to be able to express themselves 
        under one single voice, with all that this implies in terms of density 
        and sustainability in the construction of a region. It would not seem 
        sufficient to grant to the larger countries of the corresponding regional 
        space the attribution of speaking on behalf of the other countries that 
        form part of it -or that they self-arrogate this role themselves. Currently, 
        for example, neither Brazil nor Argentina in South America, nor South 
        Africa in Sub-Saharan Africa, nor Saudi Arabia or Turkey in the Middle 
        East, nor Indonesia in South East Asia could aspire to reflect per-se, 
        formally and systematically within the frame of the G20, the points of 
        view and expectations of the other countries of their respective regions. 
        Neither can this be done individually by Germany, France, Italy or the 
        UK in Europe. This is the reason why the European Union also participates 
        in the G20.  In the specific case of Mercosur, the following questions come into consideration: 
        Will it be perceived in the future as a regional economic space that expresses 
        itself under one single voice, at least in the relevant issues of the 
        international economic agenda, including international trade negotiations?, 
        and will it be able as well to reflect the interests of a broader South 
        American regional space if the announced addition of Bolivia, Ecuador 
        and eventually Colombia as full members were to take place, aside from 
        concluding the pending incorporation of Venezuela?  These are just some of the questions that can arise given the fact that, 
        on the one hand, the South American regional space complies with the requisites 
        of having a great economic dimension and a significant critical mass of 
        power -at least potentially- and, on the other hand, that two countries 
        from this geographic region -Argentina and Brazil- currently form part 
        of the G20, which aspires to become a relevant institutional nucleus in 
        the construction of a new world economic architecture. But, above all, 
        given the fact that what was agreed when it was founded was precisely 
        to create, through incremental steps, a common economic space open to 
        the participation of other South American countries.  Mercosur's semiannual Presidential Summits provide an opportunity to 
        search for answers to all of these questions at the highest political 
        level. It is befitting precisely of the Summits to contribute with new 
        energies and directions to the process of building a regional space of 
        South American scope. To renew the necessary political drive, to symbolize 
        the strategic value of the common project and to provide an environment 
        for the sincere dialogue at the highest political level are three of the 
        functions to be expected from these system of Presidential Summits. It 
        may even be said that, in a way, these are the purposes that justify its 
        existence.  In this sense, the last Summit held recently in Asuncion has proved an 
        occasion to confer political drive to the beginning of the process that 
        should lead to the addition of Bolivia and Ecuador as new members. In 
        this way they would be joining Venezuela, once the formalization for its 
        membership is concluded, since the approval of the Caracas Protocol by 
        the Paraguayan Congress is still pending. In turn, Chile has a special 
        relation with Mercosur that involves a strong degree of economic integration. 
        In addition, the eventual incorporation of Colombia has been considered 
        as well.   The President of the country that holds the semiannual pro-tempore presidency 
        plays a relevant role in sustaining the political drive necessary for 
        the construction of the regional space of Mercosur. In this second semester 
        of the year, the President of Uruguay has the opportunity to propose initiatives 
        that may aspire to achieve the consensus of the other member countries 
        and subsequently have an impact on reality.  These may be initiatives related with the agenda of priorities that Mercosur 
        may have each semester. Currently these are, among others, to perfect 
        the customs union, to deal with asymmetries, and to address productive 
        integration and foreign trade negotiations (on this regard, see the joint 
        communiqué by the presidents of the member countries and the minutes 
        of the meeting of the Common Market Council on www.mercosur.int).  These can also be initiatives aimed at introducing approaches that seek 
        to renew the process of integration by adapting it to the new global and 
        regional realities.  What transcended from the thoughts expressed by President Jose Mujica 
        to his colleagues at the recent Asuncion Summit enables us to envision 
        certain keynotes which could become the focus of his work in his temporary 
        appointment during this semester (for the ideas of the President of Uruguay 
        go to http://www.presidencia.gub.uy/). 
        From our interpretation of what was expressed by Mujica it would be 
        possible to outline three keynotes that, without exclusion of others, 
        stand out due to their potential significance. The first keynote refers to the need to interpret "the times we 
        are living in and where we are headed for". It implies the development 
        at the Mercosur scale of some efforts aimed at "decoding" the 
        world around us and understanding the effects of the intense forces that 
        shape it, all this within the perspective of the region.  This would require engaging in the preparation of a joint assessment 
        of the opportunities and challenges that certain trends of the international 
        scenario may pose for our countries. Energy and food, creativity, technical 
        progress and innovation, and consumption and production capabilities are 
        some of the key issues that could feed a joint strategic agenda of the 
        Mercosur countries in a world of large interconnected economic spaces 
        and with strong shifts in relative economic power and in the abilities 
        to compete at a global scale. 
 The installed capacity of the partner countries to make assessments that 
        help understand the international reality from a perspective of the Mercosur 
        region is vast and may be articulated in a network of competitive intelligence. 
        An example of this may be what the IPEA (Institute for Applied Economic 
        Research) is in Brazil.
 A second keynote refers to the institutional aspect. It has multiple 
        possible unfoldings, among others those aimed at investing the work methods 
        used in Mercosur with greater rationality, effectiveness and efficiency. 
       Yet, a preemptive aspect in view of what was discussed before would be 
        precisely to be able to advance the capacity of the partners to express 
        themselves under one single voice in those relevant issues of Mercosur's 
        foreign agenda. It will require an answer to the following question: Who 
        and why could speak on behalf of all the partners? Both the Doha Round 
        -and obviously the WTO- and the G20 are the appropriate ambits to move 
        forward in a previously agreed conjoint expression of the Mercosur members. 
        This would seem even more relevant precisely if the addition of new member 
        countries were to take place.  The third keynote, and possibly the most challenging, is the idea of 
        moving forward towards modalities of "digital democracy". In 
        that sense, proposals aimed at a Mercosur 2.0, with a strong emphasis 
        on transparency and the actual access to relevant information for citizens 
        would help increase the credibility and social legitimacy of the integration 
        process,  A significant breakthrough could take place in relation to the informative 
        quality of the web pages of Mercosur's bodies. Considering the present 
        situation, some substantial progress could be made in terms of the information 
        included in them and also with regards to their interactive quality.  At one point, Uruguay promoted the initiative called Somos Mercosur (in 
        English We Are Mercosur, see http://www.somosmercosur.net/). 
        Perhaps it could now be furthered in the direction of the concept of "digital 
        democracy". This would include all the relevant information, even 
        that of economic scope, so that the citizens of the member countries are 
        able to follow closely the construction of the regional space in all those 
        aspects that, in one way or the other, may affect their daily lives, be 
        it as citizens, workers, entrepreneurs consumers or in any other aspect 
        of the social activity.  In this sense, a main focus could be related to the multiple unfolding 
        of the current and potential impacts of Mercosur and its instruments on 
        the creation of productive employment. |