| It is Argentina's turn to hold the pro-tempore presidency of Mercosur 
        during the first semester of this year. A central question arises on this 
        regard: What is the benefit for the construction of Mercosur that can 
        result from this semester in which Argentina can have a leading role in 
        the joint work between countries, particularly taking into account the 
        changes that are taking place at the regional and global planes?  Whatever happens until the end of June, when the periodical Mercosur 
        Summit takes place, will certainly not depend only of Argentina. It is 
        clear that the construction of a regional integration space is a collective 
        task that can be nurtured by the contributions made by each partner in 
        view of their own national interests. Working together might then be decisive 
        in order to define the eventual achievements that are accomplished during 
        this period. In this sense, the future Chancellor of the newly elected 
        Uruguayan government has advanced his country's disposition for promoting 
        initiatives that facilitate the necessary adaptation of Mercosur to the 
        new regional and global realities. However, by exercising the pro-tempore 
        presidency, Argentina has even a greater chance of providing the political 
        thrust that is needed to move forward and, most significantly, to resolve 
        any existing entanglements. The Treaty of Asuncion established that the participation of the Presidents 
        in Council meetings would take place "at least once a year" 
        (Article 11). However, it was precisely the need to ensure a continuous 
        flow of political support at the highest level that led, as soon as the 
        Treaty was signed, to contemplate that after each semester the work developed 
        by the several competent instances through numerous meetings, sometimes 
        weekly ones, should end with a Presidential Summit within the framework 
        of the Mercosur Council. This has been the procedure since then and later 
        was formally established by Article 6 of the Ouro Preto Protocol of 1994. 
        An influence in the idea of the semiannual frequency was the experience 
        of the preceding period of bilateral integration between Argentina and 
        Brazil (1985-1990), during which the biannual presidential meetings were 
        key to upholding the original political drive. Certainly, the precedent 
        that existed in the European regional space was influential as well.  An integration process which is multidimensional (not limited to the 
        commercial aspects), complex (the interests of the countries not always 
        concur and there are deep asymmetries), and dynamic (the contexts at the 
        national, regional and global planes are changing continuously), requires 
        a periodical boost at the highest political level. Its coordination is 
        precisely the main responsibility of the country that holds the temporary 
        presidency of Mercosur and of its multiple intergovernmental component 
        bodies. This becomes of particular relevance in the case of those bodies 
        that have the competency to plan roadmaps and concrete commitments, following 
        the mandates originated in the semiannual presidential meetings or through 
        their own initiative. We are referring to the Common Market Group and 
        the periodical Meeting of Ministers of Economy and Central Bank Presidents. 
       The periods of greater progress in the construction of Mercosur in it's 
        almost 20 years of existence, prove the effectiveness of the dynamics 
        that develops between the highest political level of each country and 
        the two mentioned bodies during the course of each semester. Such dynamic, 
        in the measure that it actually develops, can lead the semiannual meeting 
        between the Council and the Presidents to produce roadmaps and decisions 
        that allow moving forward with the integration process. Given the low institutional profile that has been granted to the figure 
        of the Secretary of Mercosur, it is precisely in relation to such dynamics 
        of commitment building that the country that holds the pro-tempore presidency 
        can have a wide margin to influence, with its initiatives, the results 
        that are obtained at the end of the semester. The fact that no relevant 
        competencies have been granted to the Secretary increases the responsibility 
        of the country holding the pro-tempore presidency to attempt to finalize 
        the period with a clear added value for the construction of Mercosur. 
       At least three sets of priorities characterize the agenda of Mercosur 
        during this semester of Argentine presidency.  The first is related to the progress in significant matters that have 
        been left unresolved from previous periods. The most important of these 
        are outlined in the results of the last meeting of the Mercosur Council, 
        which took place under the Uruguayan presidency, in Montevideo, in December 
        2009, (on this subject please refer to http://www.mercosur.int/, 
        that includes the Joint Declaration of the Presidents of the member countries). 
        Some of these issues have been on the agenda for quite some time. Without 
        overlooking others, we can mention the most relevant which are: addressing 
        the existing asymmetries; institutional consolidation; the approval of 
        the Mercosur Customs Code; the elimination of the double charge of the 
        external common tariff; the mechanism for the distribution of customs 
        revenue; and the promotion of productive integration. Experience has shown 
        that it is not easy to achieve the necessary consensus regarding these 
        issues or to translate them into reality.  The second priority arises from those issues that Argentina, as the country 
        holding the presidency, will propose for consideration and eventually 
        for approval at the Council Meeting to be held in June and at the simultaneous 
        Presidential Summit. On this plane, there is ample room for the initiatives 
        that may be proposed also by other member countries -such the case of 
        Uruguay, as previously mentioned- as well as by the productive sectors. 
        These will become more effective in the measure that they result from 
        the interaction between counterparts in the different Mercosur countries, 
        especially within the network of business institutions. An example of 
        a proposal originating in the business sector and that could translate 
        into joint initiatives of companies with investments in several of the 
        countries of the region can be found in a recent article by Gustavo Grobocopatel 
        entitled "Mercosur is the sure path towards our progress". (See 
        the text of this article in Clarín newspaper of Monday 15 December 
        2009, page 31 on 
        http://www.clarin.com/). From the perspective of a businessperson 
        who runs operations in various countries of the region, he helps make 
        manifest the importance of a joint economic space -to which Chile is closely 
        linked as well- for the future development of its member countries, especially 
        when taking into account the new international realities. In the article 
        he affirms, "In times of struggle between the global and the local, 
        the regional option is inevitable and beneficial." He later adds, 
        "We should build a common agenda for growth, integration and improved 
        negotiation".  The third priority is related to the fact that the LAC-EU Summit will 
        take place during the month of May in Madrid (on this regard see the December 
        2009 edition of our Newsletter on www.felixpena.com.ar). Argentina and 
        Spain -the country that holds the European temporary presidency -have 
        an opportunity and a key responsibility to obtain on such occasion substantial 
        progress in the pending negotiation of a cooperation agreement between 
        Mercosur and the European Union. Due to its bandwagon effect and to its 
        political and economical impact, we may consider that this issue will 
        probably define the image of the Argentine period of Mercosur. Both the 
        Spanish and Argentine governments have given out clear signs of their 
        interest and willingness to achieve at least substantial progress in such 
        occasion. Likewise, the Brazilian Chancellor and the future Chancellor 
        of the new Uruguayan government have expressed similar intentions.  There are complicated entanglements that will be difficult, but not impossible, 
        to resolve in order to achieve such objective. These entanglements are 
        to account for the collapse of the negotiations in October 2004 (on this 
        matter refer to the April, May, June and July 2004 editions of our Newsletter 
        on www.felixpena.com.ar). However, the context has significantly changed 
        since then. Presently, there would seem to be more possibilities for introducing 
        flexibilities, especially in relation to sensitive matters in the planes 
        of both agricultural and industrial products. This will require ingenuity 
        and technical creativity as well as purpose and political drive, such 
        as was pointed out at the Mercosur-EU Business Forum (MEBF) Meeting with 
        the Presidents of Mercosur countries, held in Montevideo. On this occasion, 
        the MEBF members offered their collaboration. It would be advisable to 
        take full advantage of it. (For the full text of the declaration, see 
        http://www.mebforum.org). On the technical front, there are mechanisms that are compatible with 
        the WTO regulations to resolve the most critical pending problems thanks 
        to the flexibility of Article XXIV of GATT-1994, without necessarily generating 
        precedents that are inconvenient for the other international trade negotiations 
        of both blocs. "Multi-speed" and "variable geometry" 
        instruments will allow to face the most sensitive entanglements. The existing 
        asymmetries between both regions and, especially, within Mercosur itself 
        require of their use. Additionally, the inclusion of "evolutionary 
        clauses" will allow to introduce progressive modifications to the 
        preferences that are granted initially once the Doha Round, also behind 
        schedule, is concluded. It is in the political plane that actions are needed in order to make 
        the eventual technical solutions that lead to the Mercosur-EU bi-regional 
        agreement feasible. This leads to the central question: Are both regions 
        really interested in concluding an association agreement which, without 
        fully adjusting to the original idea nor to what would be advisable according 
        to a "textbook criteria", would allow to take a quantitative 
        leap in the transatlantic relations and would have a strong impact on 
        the international image of both Mercosur and the European Union? The answer to such question demands that the relations between both regions 
        be analyzed within the broader scope of the issues that rule the agenda 
        of global governance -among which those that were discussed at the Copenhagen 
        Summit regarding climate change are a clear example, (on the subject see 
        our January 2010 Newsletter on www.felixpena.com.ar).  However, it also requires considering the fact that new players currently 
        have a growing presence in the South American space -such the case of 
        China. This is not a fact that escapes the attention of European businessmen, 
        particularly in relation to the future of industrial sectors in which 
        they have a significant presence in Mercosur countries -such as the automotive 
        sector, among others; or regarding the future international competition 
        to participate with equipment, services and investments in the development 
        of the huge potential of Mercosur countries -in particular, but not limited 
        to, Brazil- for the production of food and hydrocarbons. If the answer to the question posed above were affirmative -and there 
        are many arguments in favor of this-, a main priority of the period of 
        the Argentine presidency would be to achieve at least some substantial 
        progress in the relations between Mercosur and the European Union, as 
        part of a more encompassing and diversified strategy for the international 
        insertion of its member countries. Eventually, the negotiating process 
        could end in the following semester, during the period of the Brazilian 
        presidency of Mercosur. This would have a positive effect on our country's image in terms of 
        its ability to contribute a constructive leadership in the South American 
        space, particularly together with Brazil, Chile and Uruguay. It would 
        also benefit its image in regards to its disposition to generate inter-regional 
        cooperation spaces -in this case with Europe, but at a later date with 
        other big players of world trade- that are functional to its strategic 
        interests, without overlooking the legitimate interests of the productive 
        sectors. In addition, this would provide an appropriate background to 
        encourage creative solutions for other unresolved entanglements in the 
        construction of Mercosur and even in the bilateral relations between the 
        European and Mercosur countries.  This would seem more than necessary if it were true that none of the 
        partners, not even the one with the largest relative economic weight such 
        as Brazil, seem to have a credible alternative plan aside from the current 
        Mercosur. At least this seems to be the case if we include in our analysis 
        considerations other than the economic and commercial ones, such as those 
        of strategic nature that involve the peace and stability of the South 
        American regional space.  |